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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal requires us to analyze whether alleged 
misrepresentations by the defendant Ethyl Corp. ("Ethyl")1 
vitiates application of the immunity afforded by the Noerr- 
Pennington doctrine and thus defeats Ethyl's "objective 
basis" for petitioning the government for protection of its 
bulk ibuprofen industry from imports of bulk ibuprofen by 
plaintiffs Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. and Reddy-Cheminor, Inc. 
(collectively, "Cheminor"). 
 
Cheminor's ibuprofen exports to the United States were 
found to be heavily subsidized by the Government of India 
("India"), and Cheminor was found to sell its imported 
ibuprofen in the United States at substantially less than 
fair value. The District Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Ethyl, holding that Ethyl's petition was not a 
"sham" and was thus protected activity pursuant to the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution. We 
affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Cheminor and Ethyl are both manufacturers of bulk 
ibuprofen for sale to tableters; Cheminor is an Indian 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Amended Complaint lists the defendants as "Ethyl Corporation 
and John Does 1-10." It describes the "Doe" defendants as "individuals 
and corporate entities including Ethyl's employees, agents, and 
unrelated corporate entities which conspired with Ethyl in the 
misconduct alleged in the complaint." For ease in reference, we will refer 
throughout this opinion to all defendants as "Ethyl." 
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company, and Ethyl is a United States company. On July 
31, 1991, Ethyl complained to the United States 
International Trade Commission ("ITC") and the Department 
of Commerce ("DOC") about Cheminor's dumping of 
ibuprofen and its sale at less than fair value, and Ethyl 
alleged that India was subsidizing the manufacture of the 
ibuprofen. After receiving information from Ethyl through 
its petition and a detailed questionnaire, the ITC and DOC 
made preliminary determinations that Cheminor would be 
taxed on its imports because it was receiving subsidies 
from India, it was dumping ibuprofen at less than fair value 
in the United States, and the domestic industry suffered 
material injury as a result. Before final determinations 
could be made, however, Cheminor withdrew from the U.S. 
market -- its sole distributor, Flavine International, Inc., 
canceled its orders for ibuprofen because the cost to be 
charged by Cheminor was prohibitive. Ethyl then withdrew 
its complaint from the ITC and DOC on March 4, 1992, 
stating that it would refile if necessary. 
 
Cheminor then brought federal and state antitrust claims 
and various state common law claims against Ethyl by a 
complaint filed in the District Court for the District of New 
Jersey. Cheminor moved for summary judgment, claiming 
that Ethyl's administrative complaints to the ITC about 
Cheminor's below-market pricing and the resultant injuries 
to Ethyl were baseless, made in bad faith, contained false 
statements, and were brought only for anti-competitive 
reasons. In response, Ethyl asserted that its administrative 
complaints had a legal basis, were made in good faith, and 
were truthful. As such, Ethyl argued that the Noerr- 
Pennington doctrine, which protects the right of citizens and 
corporations to petition the government for grievances and 
is based on the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, prohibits Cheminor's antitrust and unfair 
trade claims. 
 
The District Court granted Ethyl's motion for summary 
judgment, holding that Ethyl was protected from 
Cheminor's federal and state antitrust claims by Noerr- 
Pennington immunity. Specifically, the District Court held 
that no genuine issues of fact existed on the question of 
whether Ethyl had an objective basis to file a petition with 
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the ITC and the DOC. In addition, the District Court, in its 
discretion, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, 
28 U.S.C. S 1367(c), over Cheminor's tort claims brought 
under state law. The District Court did not consider 
whether it had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1332. 
 
Summary judgment was entered on behalf of defendant 
Ethyl on February 5, 1998, disposing of all claims against 
all parties.2 Plaintiff Cheminorfiled its notice of appeal on 
March 3, 1998. The District Court had subject matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1332. We 
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We give the grant of summary 
judgment plenary review. 
 
II. 
 
If a United States business or industry believes that it is 
being injured by foreign-made subsidized products that are 
imported into the United States and sold at less than fair 
value, the business or industry may seek relief from the ITC 
by filing an antidumping ("AD") and countervailing duty 
("CVD") petition ("AD/CVD petition")3 with the ITC and the 
DOC4 to obtain relief in the way of extra duties to offset 
alleged subsidies. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court's order of February 5, 1998 granted Ethyl's motion 
for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) 
"for an Order of dismissal of the Complaint." App. 3088. Because the 
grant of summary judgment and the dismissal of the complaint are 
inconsistent, we will disregard reference to the"dismissal" of Cheminor's 
complaint and treat the record as a summary judgment record. 
 
3. The CounterVailing Duty investigation inquires whether the foreign 
company received subsidies from its government. The AntiDumping 
investigation deals with the question of whether the foreign company 
actually brought the subsidized goods into the United States and sold 
them for less than fair value. 
 
4. The ITC and the DOC divide up the investigation. The ITC determines 
whether the domestic industry has suffered material injury; the DOC 
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An AD/CVD petition receives consideration at two levels. 
First, preliminary determinations of subsidies and 
antidumping are made by DOC and a preliminary 
determination of "material injury" or "threat of material 
injury" to the domestic industry is made by the ITC. The 
DOC and the ITC base their preliminary determinations 
upon the complaining firm's petition and questionnaire, the 
respondent firm's questionnaire, if available, and argument 
from all interested parties' counsel. Second, once the 
preliminary determinations have been made in petitioner's 
(here, Ethyl's) favor, the DOC imposes duties upon the 
imported product. The DOC and ITC make final 
determinations after they have conducted their own 
investigations (collecting information apart from the 
complainant's petition and questionnaire) and after they 
have heard further arguments from the parties involved.5 
 
On September 16, 1991, based upon the "best 
information available,"6 the ITC made a preliminary 
determination that there was material injury to the 
domestic market7 caused by Cheminor's receipt of subsidies 
from the Indian government and dumping of bulk ibuprofen 
into the United States market at less than fair value. App. 
2077-2147 (ITC report). On December 13, 1991, the DOC 
made a preliminary determination of countervailing duty 
(CVD). DOC determined that India had subsidized 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
determines whether the foreign company has received foreign 
government subsidies and whether the foreign company has been 
dumping product at less than fair value. 
 
5. In a preliminary determination, the ITC must determine whether there 
is a reasonable indication of material injury or the threat thereof to the 
domestic industry "by reason of" the imports under investigation. In its 
final determination, the ITC must determine that there is a material 
injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry by reason of the imports 
under investigation. 
 
6. The best information available comprised Ethyl's petition and 
questionnaire and arguments from the parties' counsel -- Cheminor 
refused to submit verified information to the ITC. 
 
7. Ethyl's ibuprofen constituted the entire domestic market because it 
was the only domestic manufacturer of ibuprofen at the time the petition 
was filed. 
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Cheminor in the amount of 43.71%, and thus DOC 
imposed a 43.71% ad valorem duty on Cheminor's 
ibuprofen. App. 1471.8 On January 13, 1992, Cheminor 
informed the ITC and DOC that it would be withdrawing 
from the United States market. 
 
On February 27, 1992, DOC made a preliminary 
determination on the antidumping (AD) petition. DOC 
found that imports of ibuprofen from India were being sold 
in the United States at less than fair value and that there 
was an estimated dumping margin of 115.94%. App. 1472.9 
Ethyl withdrew its AD/CVD petition on March 4, 1992, 
stating that it no longer believed it could succeed in a final 
determination based on its then new profit figures and 
Cheminor's decision to exit the United States market. 
 
III. 
 
A party who petitions the government for redress 
generally is immune from antitrust liability. Eastern R.R. 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 
(1961); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 
657 (1965) ("Noerr-Pennington doctrine"). This immunity 
extends to persons who petition all types of government 
entities -- legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts. 
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 
U.S. 508, 510 (1972) ("The right of access to the courts is 
indeed but one aspect of the right of petition."). "[W]here 
restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Government of India subsidized the production of bulk ibuprofen 
for export by establishing: (1) below interest rate loans for exporters, 
(2) 
post-shipment financing loans to enable exporters to extend credit to 
foreign buyers, (3) tax deductions for foreign sales, (4) a rebate of 
indirect taxes on exported merchandise, and (5) duty-free importation of 
raw materials used in exported products (Advance licenses). App. 2172- 
82. 
 
9. The basic formula for determining a dumping margin is defined as 
"the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price or 
constructed export price of the subject merchandise." 19 U.S.C. 
S 1677(35). The actual determination of the dumping margin requires 
substantial economic analyses. See, e.g., Raj Bhala, Rethinking 
Antidumping Law, 29 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 1, 30-50 (1995). 
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governmental action, as opposed to private action, no 
violation of the [Sherman] Act can be made out." Noerr, 365 
U.S. at 136 (citations omitted). 
 
Noerr-Pennington immunity does not apply, however, to 
petitions or lawsuits that are a "mere sham to cover what 
is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere 
directly with the business relationships of a competitor." 
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144. Often, a petition to the government 
causes an anti-competitive effect, but "evidence of 
anticompetitive intent or purpose alone cannot transform 
otherwise legitimate activity into a sham." Professional Real 
Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 
49, 57-58 (1993) ("PRE"). 
 
In PRE, the Supreme Court held that litigation is a sham 
if the lawsuit is "objectively baseless." But"[t]he existence 
of probable cause to institute legal proceedings precludes a 
finding that an antitrust defendant has engaged in sham 
litigation." Id. at 62. The Court then stated, "Probable cause 
to institute civil proceedings requires no more than a 
reasonable belief that there is a chance that a claim may be 
held valid upon adjudication. . . . the existence of probable 
cause is an absolute defense." Id. at 62-63 (internal 
quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). The 
Court concluded its discussion by stating "a proper 
probable-cause determination irrefutably demonstrates that 
an antitrust plaintiff [here, Cheminor] has not proved the 
objective prong of the sham exception and that the 
defendant [here, Ethyl] is accordingly entitled to Noerr 
immunity." Id. at 63. 
 
It was in this context that the Court announced a two- 
step test: 
 
       First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the 
       sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically 
       expect success on the merits. If an objective litigant 
       could conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to 
       elicit a favorable outcome, the suit is immunized under 
       Noerr, and an antitrust claim premised on the sham 
       exception must fail. Only if challenged litigation is 
       objectively meritless may a court examine the litigant's 
       subjective motivation. Under this second part of our 
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       definition of sham, the court should focus on whether 
       the baseless lawsuit conceals an attempt to interfere 
       directly with the business relationships of a competitor, 
       through the use of governmental process-- as opposed 
       to the outcome of that process -- as an anticompetitive 
       weapon. This two-tiered process requires the plaintiff to 
       disprove the challenged lawsuit's legal viability before 
       the court will entertain evidence of the suit's economic 
       viability. 
 
508 U.S. at 60-61 (1993) (citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). Accordingly, applying the Court's Noerr-Pennington 
immunity test to Ethyl's petition, we must determine 
whether Ethyl had probable cause to file its petition, and in 
making that determination, we must be satisfied that the 
petition filed was not objectively baseless in the sense that 
Ethyl could not reasonably expect success on the merits.10 
 
The Supreme Court has not addressed how alleged 
misrepresentations affect Noerr-Pennington immunity or the 
sham exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity. In PRE, the 
Court explicitly declined to decide whether the sham 
exception to immunity would include situations where the 
litigant had perpetrated "fraud" or had made "other 
misrepresentations." Id. at 61 n.6.11 Cheminor argues either 
that Noerr-Pennington immunity does not apply at all to 
petitions containing misrepresentations or that Ethyl's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We recognize that the second step of the Supreme Court's test comes 
into play only if the petition is objectively baseless and therefore 
without 
probable cause. Because, as discussed infra, we are satisfied that Ethyl's 
petition was not "objectively baseless," and that Ethyl had probable 
cause to file its petition, we have no need to discuss Ethyl's subjective 
intent, which is the subject of the second part of the Supreme Court's 
definition of sham. 
 
11. In footnote six of PRE, the Court cited Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), 
which 
allows a federal court to "relieve a party . . . from a final judgment" 
for 
"fraud . . . misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party." 
The Court also cited Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Machinery & 
Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176-77 (1965); id. at 179-80 (Harlan, J., 
concurring), in which the Court held that a purported patent-holder 
could not avoid antitrust liability for his suit against an alleged 
infringer 
if the purported patent-holder's patent was based upon material 
misrepresentations. 
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alleged misrepresentations led to the conclusion that the 
Ethyl's AD/CVD petition to the ITC and DOC was 
objectively baseless. 
 
We decline to carve out a new exception to the broad 
immunity that Noerr-Pennington provides. Rather, we will 
determine whether Ethyl's petition was objectively baseless 
under the Supreme Court's test in PRE, without regard to 
those facts that Cheminor alleges Ethyl misrepresented. If 
the alleged misrepresented facts do not infect the core of 
Ethyl's claim and the government's resulting actions, then 
the petition had an objective basis and will receive Noerr- 
Pennington immunity under the first step of PRE. While we 
do not condone misrepresentations in a judicial setting, 
neither will we deprive litigants of immunity derived from 
the First Amendment's right to petition the government if 
the alleged misrepresentations do not affect the core of the 
litigant's (here, Ethyl's) case. We note that other remedies 
such as provided by under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
11 and 60(b)(3), exist for alleged misrepresentations that do 
not taint the core of the litigant's case. See supra note 11. 
 
In Music Center S.N.C. De Luciano Pisoni & C. v. Prestini 
Musical Instruments Corp., 874 F. Supp. 543, 549 (E.D.N.Y. 
1995), the court was faced with circumstances similar to 
the circumstances we face here. Because we agree with the 
matters noted for consideration by the Music Center court, 
we will evaluate the information upon which the instant 
petition was based as the court in Music Center evaluated 
the circumstances there: 
 
       [A] determination [of objective basis] requires 
       consideration, inter alia, of the outcome of the 
       proceedings, including the findings made by the 
       relevant administrative tribunals, the nature of the 
       particular allegations of the petition or actions before 
       the administrative agency claimed to be fraudulent or 
       improper, and whether these claimed 
       misrepresentations or improper actions would have 
       been significant to the ultimate outcome or 
       continuation of the proceeding. 
 
Music Center, 874 F. Supp. at 549 (holding that defendants 
were entitled to Noerr-Pennington immunity for filing 
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AD/CVD petition despite allegations of misrepresentations 
in the petitions because the defendants had an objective 
basis for filing the petitions). If the government's action was 
not dependent upon the misrepresented information, the 
misrepresented information was not material and did not go 
to the core of Ethyl's petition. In sum, a material 
misrepresentation that affects the very core of a litigant's 
(here, Ethyl's) case will preclude Noerr-Pennington 
immunity, but not every misrepresentation is material to 
the question of whether a petition such as Ethyl's had an 
objective basis.12 
 
IV. 
 
We will assume, for the purposes of determining whether 
Ethyl had an objective basis to file its AD/CVD petition, 
that the statements that Ethyl made in its petition and 
questionnaire and are alleged by Cheminor to be false were, 
in fact, false. We note, however, that if this case were to 
proceed to trial, Cheminor might not be able to prove that 
they were false, as Ethyl has articulated reasonable 
explanations for the truth of their statements, or at least, 
that the representations made as to its financial condition 
were reasonable estimates of the profits Ethyl would 
sustain based upon predictions of various research and 
development costs and capital expenditures. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Our approach in requiring that misrepresentations must be material 
to bar Noerr-Pennington immunity is consistent with the two other circuit 
courts of appeals that have considered this issue. The Ninth Circuit held 
that Noerr-Pennington immunity does not extend to parties who make 
knowing material misrepresentations in the course of a litigative 
proceeding. See Kottle v. Northwest Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 
1998) (citing Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff, 690 F.2d 
1240, 1260 (9th Cir. 1980)). The District of Columbia Circuit disallowed 
a Noerr-Pennington defense in an action for common law torts because 
the defendants had made material misrepresentations to state securities 
regulators. Whelan v. Abell, 48 F.3d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Moreover, 
misrepresentations made to procure a patent must rise to the level of 
fraud in order to cause a patent infringement action to fail -- unethical 
behavior alone is insufficient. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, 
Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1070-71 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing Walker Process 
Equip., Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965)). 
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To have an objective basis to file a AD/CVD petition with 
the ITC and DOC, Ethyl must have had a reasonable belief 
that Cheminor was dumping ibuprofen that was subsidized 
by India in the United States at less than fair value, and 
that the dumping caused material injury or threat of 
material injury to the domestic market.13  We are satisfied 
that Ethyl had such an objective basis because (1) India 
was subsidizing at a rate of 43.71% Cheminor's production 
of ibuprofen; (2) Cheminor was dumping the subsidized 
ibuprofen in the United States at a 115.42% margin; and 
(3) Ethyl was suffering material injury or was threatened 
with material injury as a result of the dumping. 
 
Cheminor takes issue with only one of these three 
conclusions -- that Ethyl was suffering material injury or 
that it was threatened with material injury. 19 U.S.C. 
S 1677(7). Under the statute, the ITC must make three 
determinations before it can find "material injury:" 
 
       (I) the volume of the imports of the subject 
       merchandise, (II) the effect of the imports of that 
       merchandise on prices in the United States for 
       domestic like products, and (III) the impact of imports 
       of such merchandise on domestic producers of domestic 
       like products, but only in the context of production 
       operations within the United States. 
 
19 U.S.C. S 1677(7)(B)(i)(I)-(III) (emphasis added). In 
addition, the ITC "may" consider other "relevant" economic 
factors. 19 U.S.C. S 1677(7)(B)(ii). The statute goes on to 
expand upon and define each of the three required 
determinations of 19 U.S.C. S 1677(7)(B)(i)(I)-(III). Of 
concern here is the third (III) required determination for 
material injury, i.e., the impact of the imports on the 
domestic producers (underlined above). 
 
This third determination is further defined by reference to 
factors in 19 U.S.C. S 1677(7)(C)(iii)(I)-(V): 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. See Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 716, 719-20 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997); American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 
1273, 1276 (C.I.T. 1984); SMC Corp. v. United States, 544 F. Supp. 194, 
199-200 (C.I.T. 1982). 
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       (iii) Impact on affected domestic industry 
 
       In examining the impact required to be considered 
       under subparagraph (B)(i)(III), the Commission shall 
       evaluate all relevant economic factors which have a 
       bearing on the state of the industry in the United 
       States, including, but not limited to -- 
 
       (I) actual and potential decline in output, sales, 
       market share, profits, productivity, return on 
       investments, and utilization of capacity, 
 
       (II) factors affecting domestic prices, 
 
       (III) actual and potential negative effects on cash 
       flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability 
       to raise capital, and investment, 
 
       (IV) actual and potential negative effects on the 
       existing development and production efforts in the 
       domestic industry, including efforts to develop a 
       derivative or more advanced version of the domestic 
       like product, and 
 
       (V) in a proceeding under Part II of this subtitle, the 
       magnitude of the margin of dumping. 
 
       The Commission shall evaluate all relevant economic 
       factors described in this clause within the context of 
       the business cycle and conditions of competition that 
       are distinctive to the affected industry. 
 
19 U.S.C. S 1677(7)(C)(iii)(I)-(V). The ITC has discretion to 
give these factors found in S 1677(7)(C)(iii)(I)-(V) of the trade 
statute varying degrees of weight in making its 
determination of material injury. SMC Corp. v. United 
States, 544 F. Supp. 194, 199-200 (C.I.T. 1982). A court 
reviews the ITC's (and DOC's) discretionary determinations 
by "evaluating whether they are `unsupported by 
substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.' " Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 
132 F.3d 716, 719 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting 19 U.S.C. 
S 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (1994)). No one single fact about the 
domestic industry, the market, or the imported product is 
dispositive to the issue of material injury: the record as a 
whole requires evaluation. Music Center, 874 F. Supp. at 
549. 
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Cheminor alleges that Ethyl gave the ITC inaccurate 
information regarding its profitability during the first half of 
1991,14 which caused the ITC to determine erroneously that 
Ethyl had suffered material injury. Cheminor cites three 
alleged misrepresentations made by Ethyl that masked 
Ethyl's true profitability: (1) research and development 
costs and capital expenditures were allocated to thefirst 
half of 1991 but were not expected to be charged on Ethyl's 
books until the second half of 1991; (2) research and 
development costs for S+ ibuprofen should not have been 
included at all because S+ ibuprofen was not at issue in the 
AD/CVD petition; and (3) Ethyl falsified its lost sales 
resulting from Cheminor's imported product.15 All of these 
"false" statements, Cheminor alleges, resulted in the ITC's 
erroneous conclusion that Ethyl's profits were down while 
Cheminor's market share was up in the first half of 1991, 
which in turn caused the ITC to make a finding of material 
injury to Ethyl. 
 
The statements in Ethyl's petition and questionnaire 
relating to Ethyl's profitability in the first half of 1991 bear 
on only a small proportion of the numerous factors the ITC 
must consider when making a determination of material 
injury. In the instant case, the ITC found that the domestic 
market had sustained material injury. The ITC issued a 
report explaining its decision to preliminarily grant Ethyl's 
AC/CVD petition. The ITC's finding set forth in the "Views 
of the Commission" that the domestic industry incurred 
injury, relied only in part on Ethyl's representations of its 
financial condition: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Ethyl provided profitability data for the period 1988 through the 
first 
six months of 1991. Among other charges, Cheminor alleges that the 
data for the first six months of 1991 was misrepresented. However, of 
the charges made by Cheminor, each was refuted by Ethyl in its brief to 
the Court, and in any event, each of Cheminor's charges were deemed to 
be not material by the ITC. See Appellee's Br. at 15-16; infra pp. 13-14 
(discussing the views of the ITC). 
 
15. Cheminor also alleges that Ethyl made misrepresentations regarding 
Cheminor's market share that made Cheminor's market share look larger 
than it really was. However, Cheminor was in a better position to inform 
the ITC and the DOC about its own market share, but, as we have noted 
previously, see supra note 6, Cheminor chose not to furnish the ITC or 
DOC with its market share information. 
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        The financial trends provide reasonable indication of 
       present material injury. For example, as illustrated by 
       the public exhibit introduced by Ethyl at the 
       conference, the industry's [Ethyl's] profitability (as 
       measured by the profit-to-sales ratio) declined 
       substantially from the beginning to the end of the 
       investigatory period, despite an increase in 1989 from 
       the 1988 level. 
 
        Confidential information concerning other factors, 
       such as [Cheminor's] apparent domestic consumption 
       and market share, further provide a reasonable 
       indication of present injury. Accordingly, on the basis 
       of the information gathered in these preliminary 
       investigations, we find a reasonable indication of 
       material injury to the domestic industry producing 
       bulk ibuprofen. 
 
App. 2097 (footnote omitted). As demonstrated by this 
finding, the ITC relied upon a number of reasons for its 
determination that the domestic industry had been affected 
and thus that Ethyl had suffered material injury. The 
record reflects that the ITC was aware that Ethyl's research 
costs were high during the first six months of 1991. App. 
2048 (Redacted Post Conference brief of Cheminor before 
the ITC).16 Moreover, the ITC found that the market share 
and domestic consumption of Cheminor's ibuprofen 
contributed to its determination that there was material 
injury to the domestic industry. 
 
The Acting Chairman of the ITC, Anne Brunsdale, did not 
join the reasoning in the "Views of the Commission" on the 
issue of material injury to the domestic industry. Brunsdale 
thus filed "Additional Views," in essence, a concurring 
opinion to the "Views of the Commission." Brunsdale also 
found that there was material injury to the domestic 
industry, but she did not rely upon Ethyl's assertions of 
decreased profits that Cheminor has alleged to be false. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Ethyl noted in its brief that despite attempts to obtain an unredacted 
version of the Post Conference brief, Cheminor did not produce it. 
Nevertheless, it appears from the redacted version that Cheminor argued 
to the ITC that it should consider that Ethyl's research costs were higher 
than normal during the first six months of 1991. 
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Instead, she gave three reasons for her material injury 
determination: (1) the Indian imports are a suitable 
substitute for domestic ibuprofen; (2) "the alleged dumping 
and subsidy margins in these investigations are quite high;" 
and (3) the share of the U.S. market held by Indian 
ibuprofen "was not small enough, when combined with 
other factors, to ensure that there is no material injury [to 
the domestic market] by reason of the `unfair' imports." 
App. 2105-08. Brunsdale had knowledge of Ethyl's financial 
condition, but she did not find it to be determinative in 
light of the other factors indicating that the domestic 
industry was affected by Cheminor imports of ibuprofen.17 
 
Thus, all ITC Commissioners, albeit in separatefindings, 
determined that Ethyl had suffered material injury by 
Cheminor's imports based on factors other than Ethyl's 
profitability.18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. We note here that the dissent, in referring to the view of Acting 
Chairman Anne Brunsdale, does not refute the fact that Brunsdale did 
not rely on Ethyl's assertions of decreased profits. Commissioner 
Brunsdale's separate opinion itself provides evidence of Ethyl's probable 
cause to file its ITC petition. Indeed, the dissent nowhere even 
acknowledges that the standard of probable cause as announced by the 
Supreme Court in PRE, 508 U.S. at 62-63, is the crucial test in the 
determination of the applicability of Noerr-Pennington immunity, as we 
have pointed out. See supra pp. 7-8. Rather, the attempt by the dissent 
to structure a wholly separate exception to Noerr-Pennington for fraud or 
misrepresentation, which is nowhere found in the jurisprudence, cannot 
take the place of PRE's required probable cause standard. Thus, the 
question to be answered in this case under the controlling standard is 
whether by reason of Ethyl's success in having the USTR remove Indian 
ibuprofen from the General System of Preferences list, Cheminor's 
receipt of subsidies from India, Cheminor's dumping of ibuprofen in the 
United States at less than fair value, and the harm and threat of harm 
to Ethyl by reason of Cheminor's dumping, Ethyl had probable cause to 
file an AD/CVD petition. 
 
18. The dissent has not recognized that misrepresentations, if indeed 
they occurred, must be material to be acknowledged in the Noerr- 
Pennington context, as we have established. See supra pp. 9-10. Even if 
misrepresentations had been made such that Ethyl's allegations 
regarding its January through June 1991 profitability were unsupported, 
they were not deemed material in the opinions of the Commissioners. 
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Our review of the ITC and Brunsdale's analyses, in 
conjunction with the uncontested DOC preliminary 
determinations of 43.71% subsidization and 115.42% 
dumping margin, leads us to the conclusion that not only 
did Ethyl have probable cause to file its petition, but that 
substantial record evidence supported the ITC's preliminary 
determination of material injury. Thus, Ethyl's AD/CVD 
petition was not objectively baseless and the alleged 
misrepresentations, even if made, did not taint the"core" of 
Ethyl's AD/CVD petition. Accordingly, the sham exception 
to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has no application to 
Ethyl's petition, and Ethyl is entitled to First Amendment 
immunity from antitrust liability for its petition to the ITC 
and DOC. 
 
Moreover, the record reveals that in 1988, Ethyl had 
made a request to United States Trade Representative 
("USTR") that the USTR remove Indian ibuprofen from the 
General System of Preferences ("GSP") list-- a list that 
contains products that are not charged duties upon arrival 
in the United States. USTR declined to do so in 1988 
because Cheminor's impact on the U.S. market was slight 
in 1988. App. 1316. Ethyl renewed its request in 1990 
asking then that the USTR remove Indian ibuprofen from 
the GSP. At that time, USTR granted Ethyl's request 
because of Indian ibuprofen's "potential impact on U.S. 
producers." App. 1445. This latter action by USTR might 
well be inferred to have given Ethyl probable cause to seek 
further remedies available by petition from the United 
States Government to support Ethyl's continued concern 
about Indian ibuprofen.19 
 
In determining Ethyl's "objective basis for filing its 
petition," we also cannot ignore the fact that Ethyl posited 
a "threat" of material injury in addition to its present 
material injury. The ITC, as we have discussed, considered 
only Ethyl's present material injury, which we have held 
provided Ethyl with a sufficient objective basis for its 
AD/CVD petition, satisfying the Supreme Court's test. We 
recognize, however, that had the ITC made a contrary 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Again, the dissent fails to recognize that the USTR's actions gave 
Ethyl probable cause to file its AD/CVD petition. 
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finding as to actual material injury, it would have been 
obliged to address Ethyl's claimed "threat" to its ibuprofen 
sales. If that endeavor had been necessary, the ITC 
determination of "threat" would not have required any 
consideration by the ITC of the domestic industry's (i.e., 
Ethyl's) present profitability, 19 U.S.C. S 1677(7)(F)(i)(I)-(F) 
-- the one issue to which Cheminor has called attention. 
Hence, even if the ITC had not found present material 
injury based upon Ethyl's claims, the threat of material 
injury stemming from Indian subsidization and dumping at 
less than fair value in the future would have more than 
sufficed to justify Ethyl's petition. Significantly, Cheminor 
failed to adequately rebut Ethyl's threatened injury. 
 
V. 
 
Because we hold that Cheminor has not satisfied the first 
step of PRE's sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine, we have no need to address the question of 
whether Ethyl had a subjective intent to abuse government 
process.20 
 
VI. 
 
While the district court did not err in granting Noerr- 
Pennington immunity to Ethyl, it did err in dismissing 
Cheminor's state law claims on the ground that the court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Both Ethyl and 
Cheminor agree that the District Court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over Cheminor's state law claims under 28 
U.S.C. S 1332 because the parties are diverse 21 and the 
amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. However, Ethyl 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Cheminor requested discovery from Ethyl regarding issues of Ethyl's 
intent. Discovery motions were pending at the time the district court 
granted Ethyl's motion for summary judgment. In light of our affirmance 
of the District Court's opinion on the ground that Ethyl had an objective 
basis to file its petition, discovery issues as to Ethyl's subjective 
intent 
are neither relevant nor material. 
 
21. The complaint states that Cheminor Drugs is an Indian company; 
that Reddy-Cheminor is a New Jersey corporation; and that Ethyl is a 
Virginia corporation. 
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urges us to affirm dismissal of Cheminor's state law claims 
on another ground, namely, that Ethyl is entitled to Noerr- 
Pennington immunity for the state claims that Cheminor 
has asserted, in the same fashion as Noerr-Pennington 
applies to the federal antitrust claims. 
 
Specifically, Cheminor has alleged tort claims under New 
Jersey common law for malicious prosecution, tortious 
interference with contract, tortious interference with 
prospective economic advantage, and unfair competition. 
Although New Jersey has not yet decided whether the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine "extends beyond antitrust law to 
tort liability," Snyder v. American Ass'n of Blood Banks, 144 
N.J. 269, 296 (1996), we have been presented with no 
persuasive reason why these state tort claims, based on the 
same petitioning activity as the federal claims, would not be 
barred by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 
 
Indeed, at least two New Jersey District Courts have held 
that entry of summary judgment for a defendant on federal 
antitrust claims requires that summary judgment be 
entered for the defendant on state antitrust claims. Inter- 
City Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 
1120, 1124-25 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd, 888 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 
1989); Regency Oldsmobile, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 
723 F. Supp. 250, 270 (D.N.J. 1989). We are persuaded 
that the same First Amendment principles on which Noerr- 
Pennington immunity is based apply to the New Jersey tort 
claims. See Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc. v. 
Wells, 839 F.2d 155, 1159-60 (3d Cir. 1988) (Sloviter, J.) 
(holding that Noerr-Pennington immunity precludes tort 
liability for reporting nursing home violations to 
government authorities under Pennsylvania law); 22 see also 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Although the dissent argues that Brownsville did not "extend the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine to state or common law claims," Dissent at 31, 
the court in Brownsville did in fact rely on several Noerr doctrine cases 
to support its holding rejecting a cause of action for malicious 
interference with business relations. In Brownsville, the court stated: 
 
        Two lines of cases support the Sierra Club decision and that which 
       we uphold here: the defamation cases . . . and the Noerr-Pennington 
       cases teaching that the collusive use by competitors of 
legislative, 
       administrative, or judicial process does not, without more, give 
rise 
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Whelan v. Abell, 48 F.3d 1247, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("[I]t 
is hard to see any reason why, as an abstract matter, the 
common law torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of 
process might not in some of their applications be found to 
violate the First Amendment") (District of Columbia law); 
Kottle v. Northwest Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1059 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (Washington state antitrust law covered by Noerr- 
Pennington). We thus will affirm summary judgment for 
Ethyl on those claims as well as on the federal claims.23 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       to an anti-trust violation, see Eastern R.R. Conference v. Noerr 
Motor 
       Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); California Motor Transport Co. v. 
       Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). 
 
Brownsville, 839 F.2d at 160 (underlining added). The court went on to 
cite to several relevant Noerr cases: 
 
        In numerous cases, the courts have rejected claims seeking 
       damages for injuries allegedly caused by the defendants' actions 
       directed to influencing government action. See, e.g., State of 
Missouri 
       v. National Organization of Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1317 (8th Cir.), 
       cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980) (boycott campaign of NOW against 
       states not ratifying the ERA was neither tortious nor prohibited by 
       the Sherman Act because `the right to petition is of such 
importance 
       that it is not an improper interference even where exercised by way 
       of a boycott'); Protect our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District 
Court, 
       677 P.2d 1361, 1369 (Colo. 1984) (Noerr-Pennington analysis 
       applicable to suit for abuse of process and civil conspiracy); 
Rudoff 
       v. Huntington Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 91 Misc.2d 264 (N.Y. Sup. 
       1977) (`public policy dictates that the tort of interference not be 
       extended to those situations where a citizen petitions an agency of 
       his government'); Bledsoe v. Watson, 106 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Ct. App. 
       1973) (`the benefit to the public interest in allowing free 
challenges 
       to public expenditures that may circumvent the electoral process 
       outweighs any detriment that may result to private contracting 
       parties from such challenges'). Brownsville has neither 
distinguished 
       these cases nor cited any authority to support its underlying 
action. 
       . . . 
 
Id. 
 
23. After the district court improperly dismissed the state claims in this 
action, Cheminor refiled its common law state claims in New Jersey state 
court. Ethyl removed that case to federal court. The District Court 
administratively dismissed this second-filed case pending the outcome of 
this appeal. Because we are affirming the District Court's judgment in 
the instant case and are holding that Noerr-Pennington applies to the 
state law claims, those claims would be subject to a res judicata defense. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b). 
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VII. 
 
We will affirm the District Court's judgment of February 
5, 1998, which granted Ethyl's motion for summary 
judgment. 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
I dissent from the decision of the majority for two 
reasons. First, I believe the majority errs as a matter of law 
in its reading of the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine, and thereby diminishes by judicial interpretation 
the scope of the Sherman Act, a seminal congressional 
enactment. Second, I believe the facts of record are 
sufficient to withstand summary judgment. 
 
I will not repeat in detail the historical facts outlined by 
the majority. For our purposes, it is sufficient to recognize 
that appellant Cheminor, an Indian manufacturing 
company, began exporting bulk ibuprofen for sale in the 
United States in 1988, which would have created 
competition for appellee Ethyl, who was at that time the 
only U.S. manufacturer of bulk ibuprofen. 
 
Ethyl began taking steps to impede Cheminor's entry into 
the U.S. market. In addition to filing a petition with the 
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), seeking to remove Indian 
ibuprofen from the list of eligible articles, which was 
ultimately successful effective July 1, 1991, it also filed an 
anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) petition 
with the United States International Trade Commission 
(USITC) and the United States Department of Commerce 
(USDOC) accusing Cheminor of receiving generous 
subsidies from the Indian government and selling bulk 
ibuprofen on the U.S. market at below market prices. The 
USITC, which has only 45 days to make a preliminary 
determination whether, based on the best information 
available at the time, there is a reasonable indication of 
material injury to a domestic industry, or threat thereof, by 
reason of the imports under investigation, see 19 U.S.C. 
S 1671b(a), made a preliminary determination on September 
16, 1991, that there was sufficient evidence of material 
injury to the domestic market to justify taking corrective 
action against Cheminor. On December 13, 1991, the 
USDOC preliminarily determined that the Indian 
government had been subsidizing Cheminor in the amount 
of 43.71%. As a result of these two determinations, the 
USITC and/or USDOC required Cheminor's exclusive 
distributor, Flavine International ("Flavine"), to pay 43.71% 
duties on any Cheminor ibuprofen imported. 
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In response to this significant additional cost, Flavine 
canceled all orders for bulk ibuprofen. This effectively 
forced Cheminor out of the U.S. ibuprofen market. 
Cheminor notified the USITC that it would be withdrawing 
from the market. Only after Cheminor withdrew did Ethyl 
voluntarily withdraw its USITC petition. 
 
Cheminor then filed this lawsuit against Ethyl. The 
District Court granted Ethyl's motion for summary 
judgment on the antitrust claims on the ground that Ethyl 
was immune from suit under the First Amendment and the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine. It dismissed Cheminor's state 
law claims under 28 U.S.C. S 1367 (c), refusing to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction as a matter of discretion. 
 
I 
 
LEGAL ISSUE: TREATMENT OF FRAUD UNDER 
NOERR-PENNINGTON 
 
Under the majority's decision, even a party who has 
committed blatant and intentional fraud and 
misrepresentation in a judicial or administrative proceeding 
is entitled to the protection that the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine affords from suit under the antitrust laws. I do not 
believe that Noerr-Pennington goes as far as to cover abuse 
of process; I do not believe that it should. 
 
The rationale given by the Supreme Court for its holding 
in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961), that"no violation of 
the [Sherman] Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to 
influence the passage or enforcement of laws," was the 
dissimilarity between an agreement to lobby for legislation 
and an agreement to price-fix or boycott, id. at 137, the 
concern about impairing the ability of persons to make 
known their wishes to their legislators, id., the 
unwillingness to apply the Sherman Act to political activity, 
id., and the First Amendment protection of the right to 
petition, id. at 137-38. This holding was extended to 
attempts to influence the executive branch, specifically the 
Secretary of Labor, in United Mine Workers of America v. 
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). Yet another extension was 
 
                                22 
  
added in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972), when the Court 
ruled that citizens' attempts to influence administrative 
agencies or courts similarly may not engender antitrust 
liability. The majority relies upon this doctrine in holding 
that Cheminor cannot base its antitrust claims on Ethyl's 
attempts to influence the USITC and USDOC. 
 
However, the Noerr-Pennington exception to the antitrust 
laws is not unlimited. The Court in Noerr made that clear 
when it stated, "There may be situations in which a 
publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing 
governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is 
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly 
with the business relationship of a competitor and the 
application of the Sherman Act would be justified," thereby 
describing what has come to be known as the "sham" 
exception. 365 U.S. at 144. 
 
Thereafter, in holding that because of the sham exception 
the antitrust laws applied to the conduct of highway 
carriers who allegedly engaged in concerted action to 
institute state and federal proceedings to resist and defeat 
applications by competitive highway carriers to acquire, 
transfer or register those rights, the Supreme Court held 
that "[m]isrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, 
are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory process." 
California Motor Transport, 404 U.S. at 513. If the activity 
were proven, the antitrust laws would apply. 
 
Thus, I believe, and there are cases so holding, that the 
"sham" exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity from the 
antitrust laws includes at least two separate and 
independent grounds for holding that a particular litigant is 
not immune from antitrust liability: (1) that the litigation 
was objectively baseless, and (2) that the litigation was 
based on knowing and material misrepresentations. The 
District Court never considered whether Ethyl's AD/CVD 
petition might be a sham based on the second ground. The 
majority holds this was not error, and in doing so relies on 
the Supreme Court's most recent decision on this subject. 
 
In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia 
Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993) (PRE), the 
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Court, in "defin[ing] the `sham' exception to the doctrine of 
antitrust immunity first identified in [Noerr] as that doctrine 
applies in the litigation context," held that "litigation cannot 
be deprived of immunity as a sham unless the litigation is 
objectively baseless." Id. at 51. The majority reads that as 
holding that "objective baselessness" is the only exception 
to Noerr-Pennington. However, nothing in PRE repudiated 
the holding in California Motor Transport. Rather, the PRE 
Court expressly reserved the question whether and to what 
extent the test it announced would apply in the event that 
the litigation involved misrepresentations or other highly 
disfavored conduct. It stated: 
 
       In surveying the "forms of illegal and reprehensible 
       practice which may corrupt the administrative or 
       judicial processes and which may result in antitrust 
       violations," we have noted that "unethical conduct in 
       the setting of the adjudicatory process often results in 
       sanctions" and that "[m]isrepresentations, condoned in 
       the political arena, are not immunized when used in 
       the adjudicatory process." California Motor Transport, 
       404 U.S., at 512-513. We need not decide here whether 
       and, if so, to what extent Noerr permits the imposition 
       of antitrust liability for a litigant's fraud or other 
       misrepresentations. 
 
PRE, 508 U.S. at 61 n.6 (citations omitted). 
 
The majority's decision to disregard the facts that 
Cheminor alleges Ethyl misrepresented is contrary to the 
position of the two other courts of appeals that have 
considered this issue. Both of these courts read PRE to 
preserve a fraud exception to antitrust immunity, although 
they vary in their interpretation of that exception. See 
Whelan v. Abell, 48 F.3d 1247, 1254-55 (D.C. Cir. 1995); 
Kottle v. Northwest Kidney Centers, 146 F.3d 1056, 1060 
(9th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed 67 U.S.L.W. 3364 
(U.S. Nov. 17, 1998) (No. 98-810). 
 
For example, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia has held that litigation that is based on 
misrepresentations does not enjoy immunity either under 
Noerr-Pennington or under the First Amendment. In 
Whelan, the district court had dismissed the antitrust 
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complaint on the grounds that the defendants were 
immune from liability under Noerr-Pennington because the 
litigation they pursued was not objectively baseless. See 48 
F.3d at 1253. In reversing that decision, the appellate court 
agreed with the plaintiffs that, even if the litigation was not 
baseless, the defendants were not entitled to immunity if 
they made deliberately false and material representations in 
the course of that litigation. The court reasoned that 
because Noerr-Pennington immunity is based, at least in 
part, on respect for the First Amendment right to petition 
for redress of grievances, and because "[h]owever broad the 
First Amendment right to petition may be, it cannot be 
stretched to cover petitions based on known falsehoods," it 
followed that Noerr-Pennington did not immunize the 
defendants from liability based on their misrepresentations. 
Id. at 1254-55. 
 
A fraud exception to Noerr-Pennington in the litigation 
context was also recognized in Kottle, where the Ninth 
Circuit stated, "[I]n the context of a judicial proceeding, if 
the alleged anticompetitive behavior consists of making 
intentional misrepresentations to the court, litigation can 
be deemed a sham if `a party's knowing fraud upon, or its 
intentional misrepresentations to, the court deprive the 
litigation of its legitimacy.' " 146 F.3d at 1060 (quoting 
Liberty Lake Inv., Inc. v. Magnuson, 12 F.3d 155, 158-59 
(9th Cir. 1993)). 
 
The majority relegates these cases to a footnote for the 
proposition that the misrepresentation must be material, 
without acknowledging that the Ninth and District of 
Columbia Courts of Appeals, unlike it, accept 
misrepresentation as an independent prong of the sham 
exception to Noerr-Pennington. By thus conflating the 
concepts of "material" and "objectively baseless," the 
majority ignores the risk that a party will intentionally use 
fraud and misrepresentation to transform a claim that is 
otherwise weak and unlikely to prevail, although not 
"objectively baseless," into one that succeeds. 
 
Given the cited appellate authority, it is inexplicable to 
me why the majority has chosen to rely for its precedent on 
the district court decision in Music Center S.N.C. DiLuciano 
Pisoni & C. v. Prestini Musical Instruments Corp., 874 F. 
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Supp. 543 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). In that case, the court refused 
to permit plaintiffs to proceed to discovery in an antitrust 
claim based on material misrepresentations without first 
establishing a colorable claim that the challenged litigation 
was objectively baseless. 
 
Many of the arguments made by the majority are 
effectively answered in Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain 
Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1982), a 
case in which the court reversed the summary judgment 
granted to defendant trucking companies and their rate 
bureau, who had filed protests with the Interstate 
Commerce Commission with regard to the plaintiff 's 
shipping rates. The Court of Appeals rejected the 
defendants' attempts to cloak themselves with the mantle of 
Noerr-Pennington immunity, noting that, unlike in the 
political arena, immunizing defendants from liability based 
on misrepresentations made in an adjudicatory context 
could undercut the effectiveness of the adjudicatory body. 
It explained: 
 
       There is an emphasis on debate in the political sphere, 
       which could accommodate false statements and reveal 
       their falsity. In the adjudicatory sphere, however, 
       information supplied by the parties is relied on as 
       accurate for decision making and dispute resolving. 
       The supplying of fraudulent information thus threatens 
       the fair and impartial functioning of these agencies and 
       does not deserve immunity from the antitrust laws. 
 
Id. at 1261. 
 
To follow further the Clipper court's distinction between 
petitioning the legislature and petitioning a court, I quote 
from other pertinent language in the opinion: 
 
       Adjudicatory procedures will not always ferret out 
       misrepresentations. Administrative bodies and courts 
       . . . rely on the information presented by the parties 
       before them. They seldom, if ever, have the time or 
       resources to conduct independent investigations. The 
       recognition, however, of a private right of action based 
       on the fraudulent misrepresentation, might be 
       sufficient incentive to induce parties not to 
       fraudulently misrepresent facts. 
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Id. at 1262. Moreover, the Clipper court, like the court in 
Whelan, noted that the First Amendment does not protect 
such false petitioning: 
 
       There is no first amendment protection for furnishing 
       with predatory intent false information to an 
       administrative or adjudicatory body. The first 
       amendment has not been interpreted to preclude 
       liability for false statements. 
 
Id. at 1261. 
 
Unlike the majority, I conclude that the District Court 
erred in recognizing only a single exception to Noerr- 
Pennington immunity based on "objective baselessness," 
and would remand to that court for further consideration. 
 
II 
 
IS THERE SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS OF FRAUD 
AND MISREPRESENTATION TO WITHSTAND 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT? 
 
Cheminor has raised sufficient questions of fact to 
survive summary judgment under the "sham" exception as 
I have delineated it. Cheminor alleges that when Ethyl filed 
the AD/CVD petition, it knew it would not be able to 
establish all of the elements of an antidumping or 
countervailing duty claim, and intentionally and materially 
misrepresented its financial condition in order to overcome 
this difficulty. It alleges that Ethyl misrepresented, inter 
alia, (1) Ethyl's profits and costs,1 (2) the customers Ethyl 
allegedly lost to Cheminor, and (3) specific sales Ethyl 
allegedly lost to Cheminor. Because Cheminor has 
submitted some evidence to support these allegations, I, 
like the majority, must assume that the statements 
Cheminor alleges were false are, in fact, false. I conclude 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In addition to its contention that Ethyl misrepresented data for the 
first six months of 1991, Cheminor also contends that Ethyl 
"intentionally and wrongfully underreported its profits to the ITC by $1.5 
million dollars (over three years)" and that Ethyl misrepresented its 1990 
profits. Appellants' Br. at 14, 16. 
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that these misrepresentations were sufficiently material to 
bring them within the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington 
immunity. 
 
To prevail in the AD/CVD case, Ethyl had to show that 
Cheminor received government subsidies, it sold the 
product at less than fair value, there was material injury to 
the domestic industry, and this injury was by reason of 
Cheminor's exports. A failure to show any one of these 
elements would have defeated Ethyl's claim. A 
misrepresentation was thus material to the extent that the 
truth would have tended to disprove the existence of any 
one of the elements. 
 
Cheminor contends that Ethyl's misrepresentations were 
material to the USITC's determination that material injury 
to the domestic industry probably had occurred. In making 
that determination, the USITC must by statute consider "(I) 
the volume of the imports of the subject merchandise, (II) 
the effect of the imports of that merchandise on prices in 
the United States for domestic like products, and (III) the 
impact of imports of such merchandise on domestic 
producers of domestic like products . . . ." 19 U.S.C. 
S 1677(7)(B)(I). Further, in assessing the impact imports 
have had on domestic producers, the USITC must consider 
"all relevant economic factors which have a bearing on the 
state of the industry in the United States," which in this 
case was Ethyl. 19 U.S.C. S 1677(7)(C)(iii). The USITC was 
specifically directed to consider: 
 
       (I) actual and potential decline in [Ethyl's] . . . sales 
       [and] profits, . . . 
 
       (II) factors affecting [Ethyl's] prices, 
 
       (III) actual and potential negative effects on [Ethyl's] 
       cash flow, . . . 
 
       (IV) actual and potential negative effects on [Ethyl's] 
       existing development and production efforts . . ., and 
 
       (V) . . . the magnitude of the margin of dumping. 
 
Id. The misrepresentations Cheminor alleges Ethyl made 
directly concern Ethyl's sales, profitability, prices, and 
cashflow -- three of the five statutorily-mandated indicia of 
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injury. By law, they were thus material to the USITC's 
decision making. 
 
Moreover, as even the majority admits, the USITC 
actually "relied . . . in part on Ethyl's representations of its 
financial condition" in determining that Ethyl's application 
justified imposing punitive tariffs on Cheminor. The USITC 
stated in its "Views of the Commission": 
 
        The financial trends provide a reasonable indication 
       of present material injury. For example . . . the 
       industry [Ethyl's] profitability (as measured by profit- 
       to-sales ratio) declined substantially from the 
       beginning to the end of the investigatory period, despite 
       an increase in 1989 from the 1988 level. 
 
        Confidential information concerning other factors, 
       such as apparent domestic consumption and market 
       share, further provide a reasonable indication of 
       present injury. 
 
App. at JA 2097 (footnote omitted). 
 
The fact that the USITC also relied on other factors, such 
as Cheminor's market share, in reaching its determination 
cannot disprove the materiality of the misrepresentations. 
Neither Ethyl nor the majority have suggested any reason 
to believe that the USITC would not have reconsidered its 
decision had it known that Cheminor's financial condition 
was improving. The USITC might have decided that strong 
evidence of a financially healthy domestic industry 
outweighed any data suggesting that Cheminor's market 
share was increasing. Ethyl's misrepresentations deprived 
the USITC of that opportunity, undermining the legitimacy 
of its decision making process. 
 
Nor can Ethyl refute the materiality of the alleged 
misrepresentations by claiming that the USITC could have 
based its determinations on the threat of material injury. 
Ethyl admits that neither the District Court nor the USITC 
considered whether the evidence it submitted established a 
colorable claim of threat of harm. The fact that the 
misrepresentations might not have been material to a 
determination the USITC concededly did not make says 
little about whether the same misrepresentations affected 
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the determination it concededly did make. Similarly, the 
USTR's decision to remove Indian ibuprofen from the GSP 
in 1990 is irrelevant to the determination whether Ethyl's 
alleged misrepresentations affected the USITC's decision. 
 
The majority, apparently in an attempt to negate 
materiality, notes that Acting Chairman Anne Brunsdale, 
writing separately, "did not rely on Ethyl's assertions of 
decreased profits" in reaching her decision. An individual 
Commissioner's views do not in any way indicate that the 
misrepresented facts were not material to the other 
Commissioners or to the Commission's decision. In any 
event, even Acting Chairman Brunsdale said she found 
Ethyl's financial information "useful in determining whether 
the injury resulting from any dumping and subsidization is 
material." App. at JA 2105. 
 
The majority's suggestion that the alleged 
misrepresentations are not material because "they were 
deemed to be not material by the ITC" is even less 
persuasive. The Commissioners had not learned of the 
falsity of Ethyl's representations at the time they reached 
their decision and thus they had no opportunity to judge 
their materiality. I can only assume that the majority 
means to say that the Commissioners did not deem Ethyl's 
profitability figures to be material in reaching a decision. 
As I explain above, I find this interpretation of the 
Commissioners' actions untenable. 
 
Of more concern is the majority's apparent belief that the 
issue turns on whether Ethyl had probable cause tofile its 
petition. As I have explained, a party's use of material 
misrepresentations in filing an action is a separate and 
independent ground for denying Noerr-Pennington 
immunity. 
 
Finally, I note that the majority extends Noerr-Pennington 
immunity beyond the antitrust context, and holds it also 
governs Cheminor's state common law claims. This court 
has not previously so held, and I believe we should not 
expand the scope of Noerr-Pennington immunity to cover 
claims of any variety -- common law or statutory, federal or 
state -- without significantly more consideration than the 
majority devotes to this issue. See Whelan, 48 F.3d at 
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1253-55 (identifying concerns raised by the application of 
Noerr-Pennington defense to common law claims without 
deciding whether such application is mandated by the First 
Amendment). 
 
I see no need to engage in a monologue on that issue in 
the posture of this case. I do note that the case the majority 
refers to for its expansion of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 
Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc. v. Wells , 839 
F.2d 155, (3d Cir. 1988), which (perhaps not coincidentally) 
I authored, did not purport to extend the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine to state or common law claims; it merely held that 
"action designed to bring a facility's noncompliance with 
applicable regulations to the attention of the appropriate 
authorities" cannot form the basis of a damage action, and 
drew analogies to cases rejecting claims based on 
petitioning activity. That can hardly be used as support for 
the majority's very different determination that fraudulent 
action, designed to elicit administrative action, is immune 
from any liability, whether under federal, state, statutory or 
common law. 
 
Whether Cheminor's state law claims fall within an 
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine turns on 
precisely the same considerations as the determination 
whether its federal claims fall within that exception. 
Because I disagree with the majority's conclusion that Ethyl 
is entitled to immunity from Cheminor's antitrust claims 
and its state law claims, I respectfully dissent. 
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